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Administrative Discharge Procedures for
Involuntary Civilly-Committed Mental
Patients: An Alternative
Historically, state practices governing institutionalization of mental
patients have escaped serious challenge. Sparked, however, by a rising
societal concern for individual rights' and an increasing recognition of
the pervasiveness of mental illness,2 litigators and commentators are now
demanding a more critical examination of the treatment of mental pa-
tients. In accord with these realizations, this note will focus on in-
voluntary, civilly-committed patients in state mental hospials and will
examine both highly protective systems recently enacted by some states
as well as failures of discharge procedures in others. An alternative
system, providing a second level of administrative review, with some
improvements on judicial review, will be recommended for those states
which currently maintain inadequate procedures and which realistically
cannot or will not bear the cost of more protective systems.
IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE DISCHARGE PROCEDURES
Most litigation involving the rights of involuntary civil patients fo-
cuses on the lack of due process in commitment procedures and on depri-
vations and abuses occurring within institutions.' Discharge procedures
are largely ignored because it is assumed discharges were relatively easy
to obtain. Inadequate funding and understaffing often make speedy
discharges the only realistic goal of mental institutions." Moreover,
judicial relief is available in some states when an administrative dis-
charge is refused. In addition, with a result completely inapposite to
the state's avowed goal of protecting society, a patient can sometimes
1 Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAv. L. REv.
1190 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
2 Psychiatrists predict that one in ten persons will be afflicted with a serious mental
illness. R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAuL, HosPITALIzATION AND DISCHARGE OP THE
MENTALLY ILL 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ROCK].
3 See generally O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct 2486 (1975) ; Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972) ; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) ; Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).4 RocK, supra note 2, at 216; AmERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND THE LAW 137 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock 1971) [hereinafter cited as
BRAKEL].
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obtain administrative discharge merely by threatening to sue.5 Institu-
tions often lack staff time to devote to courtroom adjudication as well as
motivation to appear. Similarly, they seek to avoid potential adverse
publicity. Thus, unless a patient is truly dangerous, the institution
usually will not contest the suit.' These factors combined with a high
rate of discharge7 might make proposed changes in discharge statutes
appear unnecessary. The following considerations, however, demon-
strate a compelling need for revision.
Proper discharge procedures could provide a valuable check on in-
adequate commitment protections, or they might serve to remedy a judg-
mental error.' In addition, within institutions tragically inadequate
funding9 and non-compliance with standards of the American Psychi-
atric Association 0 have produced a situation which cannot be remedied
by stricter commitment standards. For example, due to understaffing
in one Texas hospital, 45 people on a ward of 134 had never been di-
agnosed." Individual discharges do not always occur as fast as national
statistics indicate.12 In some instances, patients were even found to have
been purposely retained because they were good, low-cost workers. 8
The possibility of a patient obtaining a "too easy" discharge, such
as by merely threatening suit, is itself troubling. The discharge is
5 RoCK, supra note 2, at 241.
6 Id. at 235.
7BRAKEL, supra note 4, at 136. Statistics show that in one year there were 495,077
admissions and 525,584 discharges. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE,
MENTAL HEALTH STATIsTICs, CuRRENT FACILITY REPORTS: PROVISIONAL PATIENT MOVE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA, STATE AND COUNTY MENTAL HOSPITALS, UNTE
STATES, JULY 1, 1968-JuNE 30, 1969, at 5.
8 RocK, supra note 2, at 214.
9 In a brief filed in the Wyatt case, the lawyer for the plaintiffs stated that Alabama
had allocated more funds for a sports hall of fame, a junior-miss pageant, a swine and
cattle show, and maintenance of the White House of the Confederacy than for mental
health programs. Offir, Revolution in Bedlam, PsYcHoLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1974, at 64.
10 Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right to Treatment," 23 A.A. L. REv. 623,
631-35 (1971).
The seven suggested standards are: 1. Hospitals should be accredited by the Joint
Commission of Accreditation of Hospitals; 2. Hospitals should be accredited by the So-
cial Security Administration; 3. Hospitals should be accredited by the American Psy-
chiatric Association; 4. There should be a minimum staff-patient ratio; 5. Medical and
psychiatric professionals should be state-licensed; 6. There should be required progress
reports; 7. Intermediate facilities should be provided. In many institutions visited,
doctor-patient ratios of 1/600 were common, RocK, supra note 2, at 225. Cf. Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Appendix A).
11 Gainfort, How Texas is Reforming its Mental Hospitals, THE REPORTER, Nov. 29,
1956, at 20.
12For example, in West Virginia in 1972-73 commitments averaged 15.91 years.
State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, - W. Va. - , 202 S.E.2d 109, 121 (1974).
is RocK, supra note 2, at 228; Goldman and Ross, The Patients Who Shouldn't Be In,
PARtuE, Nov. 11, 1956, pt. I, at 11, 17.
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granted "against medical advice," a designation which might prevent
future voluntary commitment.14 On the other hand, if a dangerous
patient is released without medical approval, the public is inadequately
protected.
Equally troubling is the phenomenon of institutionalization: a psy-
chological reaction involving an increased dependence on the security
and routine of the institution. While the patient remains in the hospi-
tal, community and family connections disappear and unused skills de-
teriorate." In other words, chances for release decrease as the length
of commitment increases." The resulting passivity may help to explain
the lack of discharge litigation, as patients must generally initiate their
own suits.
STATE DISCHARGE PROCEDURES
Limited commitment, a model adopted in at least ten states,1 best
protects a patient's right to liberty. Under such a scheme, the original
commitment is statutorily limited to a period believed sufficient to effect
improvement (usually six months). If, at the end of that period, the
staff believes further commitment necessary, there must be a judicial
hearing in which the state bears the burden of justifying extended hos-
pitalization. Recommitment is usually limited to a year.
Less protective are periodic examinations required in more than
thirty states.'" Although under this system patients are committed and
released through judicial and administrative procedures, the hospital is
also required to conduct periodic examinations (from every six months 9
to "as frequently as practicable" 2 ) to determine if the patient meets
statutory standards for release. Even though some type of examina-
14 RocK, supra note 2, at 236.
15 Note, Remedies for Individuals Wrongly Detained in State Mental Institutions
Because of their Incompetency to Stand Trial: Implementing Jackson v. Indiana, 7
VAL. L. REv. 203, 217 (1973).
15 RocK, supra note 2, at 228.
17 CAT. WEFL. & INST'NS CODE § 5304 (West 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467
(Supp. 1975) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88.506.4-6 (1971) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 2334,
2374 (Supp. Pamphlet 1973); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123 §§ 4, 8 (Supp. 1974);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B :38 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 31.33
(McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7 (1974) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.05.320 (Supp. 1975).
Is Twenty jurisdictions provide only for periodic medical review. See Developments,
supra note 1, at 1382 n.30.
19 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5131 (Rev. 1974) ; Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 202.239
(1972).20 E.g., A.A. CODE tit. 45, § 252(al5) (Cum. Supp. 1973) ; M o. ANN. STAT. § 202.827
(1972).
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tion is guaranteed, making it less likely that patients will be "lost,"'" op-
portunities to contest the institutional decision remain inadequate. More-
over, periodic examination requirements are sometimes simply ignored.2
Many states do not provide either alternative. Instead, administra-
tive release procedures must be initiated by a doctor or someone working
with the patient.2" Most statutes leave the initial release decision to the
discretion of the hospital superintendent or his designated .representa-
tives. 4 If an administrative discharge is denied or never sought, several
judicial remedies are available. All states grant review of original com-
mitments and the right to petition for habeas corpus.25 Additionally, 37
states and the District of Columbia" provide a judicial hearing to con-
test continuing detention. Procedural requirements and guarantees range
from requiring the patient to secure a physician's certification of sanity'
to guaranteeing a free, independent psychiatric examination. 8
This note is addressed to states29 without a statutory right to a judi-
cial hearing as well as to those with an inadequate review of denials of
administrative discharge. Despite the availability of judicial review
and habeas corpus, such a hearing is constitutionally required under the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments." Arguably,
a second-level administrative review may more satisfactorily protect all
interests than the judicial hearings presently utilized by many states.
21 ROCK, supra note 2, at 225.
22 Id. at 218-19.
23 BRAKEL, supra note 4, at 136; RocK, supra note 2, at 52, 232. Some provide this
in addition to the schemes discussed above. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1379 n.11.24 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2924 (Cum. Supp. 1973) ; MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.1476 (1975).
25 Review is a natural part of the judicial procedure. Habeas corpus is available
either at common law or by statute. BRA=r, supra note 4, at 139. For habeas corpus
provisions, see Developments, supra note 1, at 1381 n.22.
28 See Developments, supra note 1, at 1379-80 n.15.
27 See Developments, supra note 1, at 1380 n.21.
The patient or a relative may request that the patient be examined by a physi-
cian from the hospital. If the superintendent believes the patient should remain
hospitalized and the doctor who examined the patient agrees, the patient cannot
obtain court review. A patient is permitted to employ an outside physician at
his own expense and an indigent patient may request the state to provide an
outside physician. . . . [But] [e]ven if the patient is able to find a doctor to
support him, the court may, under the statutes, simply dismiss the petition with-
out a hearing.
Id. 28 See MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1476 (1975) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253.19(3)
(1971).
29 Alabama, Arkansas, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming (New York and North Carolina also do not permit patients to re-
quest a hearing but there patients are committed under the more protective limited com-
mitment system).
80 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
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Such an administrative system should be considered because it would
protect both patients denied administrative discharges and those too pas-
sive to initiate any action on their own behalf. This administrative pro-
cedure would also be less costly and time-consuming than theoretically
more protective schemes such as limited commitment and periodic ex-
amination.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A HEAPING
Analogous Right-to-Hearing Decisions
Recent Supreme Court decisions require an administrative or judi-
cial hearing whenever a government agency, federal or state, makes any
determination that inflicts a "grievous loss" 1 upon an individual."
Since public mental hospitals are units of a state agency (the department
of mental health)," the requisite state action is easily found in a super-
intendent's determinations.
Upon first glance the "losses" involved in previous right-to-hearing
cases differ conceptually from the loss resulting from an incorrect dis-
charge determination. The parolee whose "conditional liberty"', is re-
voked, and the welfare recipient whose benefits are terminated experi-
ence an immediate deprivation. Because the patient remains in the same
situation when the state's justification for detention no longer exists, his
loss appears less severe. Upon closer examination, however, the anal-
ogy strengthens. The right to liberty attaches when the justification
for confinement, such as the need for treatment,"3 no longer exists.3 6
Therefore, if the superintendent erroneously retains a patient in an in-
stitution when he actually meets the statutory criteria for release, the
patient is being deprived of liberty beginning with the incorrect de-
termination.
At least one court has implicitly relied on similar reasoning. The
district court in Ackies v. Purdy," citing prior right-to-hearing cases,88
31 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
32 Note, The Parole-Release Decision-Due Process and Discretion, 33 LA. L. REv.
708, 710 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Parole Release Decision]; Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension from high school) ; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951) (designation of organizations as Communist).
33 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-13-1-4 (Code ed. 1973).
34 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
35 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
36 Developments, supra note 1, at 1386.
37 322 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1970). Cf. United States v. Thornton, 344 F. Supp.
249, 251 (D.C. Del. 1972) (A judicial hearing, although less than full-scale, is constitu-
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granted a bail hearing to a defendant detained prior to trial despite the
lack of change in physical circumstances. The distinction between re-
maining in custody and losing welfare benefits was either ignored or
deemed unimportant. The stakes are higher and a hearing even more
important for a mental patient facing a potentially indeterminate stay
than for a defendant who will eventually have a trial.
Distinguishing Rights Accorded Detained Prisoners
Although the right to a parole hearing has not been accorded to de-
tained persons most similarly situated to institutionalized mental patients,
prisoners eligible for parole, 9 several important distinctions may be
drawn between the two groups. An initial parole board determination
affects only a privilege accorded by the state.4" In contrast, a superin-
tendent's determination might abridge a patient's right to liberty,"
which, under Goldberg v. Kelly," requires greater protection.
The potential parolee already enjoys a more advantageous situation
because his application is considered by several board members.' s Al-
though some commentators lament the qualifications and potential social
biases of parole boards," a decision is reached by combining the quali-
ties and opinions of several board members. A mental patient, on the
other hand, is subject to the judgment and prejudices of a single indi-
vidual. 5 Parole decisions are also more closely regulated by statute."
The possibility of an indeterminate stay increases the importance of a
correct determination for a mental patient. Thus, the denial of parole
hearings is not a barrier to the right to a hearing for mental patients.
tionally required before termination of civil commitment for drug rehabilitation. The
patient, prompted by threat of criminal charges upon termination, desired to remain in
the program).88E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
89 See 1 PLI, PRISONERS' RIGHTS 203 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRISONERS'
RIGHTS]; Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1023 (1971).
4 PRISONERS' RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 271; The Parole-Release Decision, supra
note 32, at 714.
Under Goldberg, the right to a hearing depends on the degree of loss rather than on
the distinction between a right and a privilege. Nevertheless, the deprivation of a right
remains more likely to satisfy the "grievous loss" standard.
41 The Parole-Release Decision, supra note 32, at 714.
42 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4D. DRESSLE, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 86 (1969).
44 PRISONERS' RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 292.
45 The doctor, often the real decisionmaker, is not always as qualified as may be sup-
posed. Some doctors may suffer from an "institutional myopia," basing their judgments
solely on the patient's adaptation to the hospital.
4OSee Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Standards Mandating the Right to a Hearing
Some courts require a hearing when an individual might be injured
by a governmental body47 or when an agency determination directly af-
fects the legal rights of an individual.4 If a discharge determination
were examined under such standards, a hearing would be required."
In other cases, the individual interest is balanced against the burden
imposed on the government.9 " Under such scrutiny, the patient's right
to liberty would rank high as a protected interest while the government
interest in discharge determinations, consisting of three conflicting goals,
is more complex than in previous right-to-hearing cases. The govern-
ment must limit costs while fulfilling its responsibilities: first, to a non-
criminal who has merely deviated from a vaguely defined norm; and
second, to the public who should be protected. Satisfactory resolution
demands that commitment and discharge standards be narrowly drawn
(a mandate also required by soaring hospital costs) while standards and
procedures also must accurately identify dangerous persons. For such
a complex decision, a hearing should be a minimal requirement.
In addition to the balancing test, courts also consider the impact of
the determination. For example, in Hannah v. Larche,5' a citizen de-
manded a chance to appear before a presidential commission created to
report violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and recommend pro-
gram changes to the President and Congress. A hearing was not re-
quired because the Commission's "function [was] purely investigative
and fact-finding . . . . It [did] not make determinations depriving
anyone of his life, liberty, or property." 2  A due process hearing was
required in Jenkins v. McKeithen"3 involving a labor commission charged
with investigating criminal activities, "exercis[ing] a function very much
akin to making an official adjudication of criminal culpabilty."' This
"purpose" standard, when applied to a discharge determination which
might result in unconstitutional detention," also strongly mandates a
7 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
48 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
49 See note 18 supra & text accompanying.
50 See cases cited note 32 supra. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. Mc-
Elroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (hearing refused because the govermment's right to ex-
clude aliens was "absolute" while the individual interest was "sm-all").
51363 U.S. 420 (1960).
52 Id. at 441.
r,s 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
64 Id. at 427.
55 If the patient is no longer in need of hospitalization, but he is detained because of
an incorrect adjudication, his detention is unconstitutional under O'Connor.
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hearing.
Inadequacies of Judicial Review and Habeas Corpus
Appeal of the original commitment, a right granted by all states,",
does not satisfy the hearing requirement." In some states, the trial
judge's decision is conclusive, 8 and the validity of continuing detention
may not be challenged.59
Under some statutes, a habeas corpus hearing might supply ade-
quate protection while in other states, an additional hearing would be
required. Early statutes provided only for a review of the original
commitment,"0 but most states now grant a right to contest continuing
detention."' The writ, however, is an extraordinary remedy, sometimes
available only after all state remedies have been exhausted and other
statutory requirements satisfied.62 Unless a maximum waiting period is
specified, 5 such petitions are also subject to the delay characteristic of
the judicial system. Even if a petition is granted, the ensuing hearing
may not incorporate many of the protections guaranteed in a criminal
trial. Moreover, the only remedy may be the reopening of sanity proceed-
56 See note 25 supra.
57 In some states, the appellate court may choose not to review even the trial judge's
discretion. See Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Clendening v. McCall,
145 Ohio St. 82, 60 N.E.2d 676 (1945). Contra Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (review available).
5S E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-22-1-14 (Code ed. 1974).
59 The review on appeal is limited to the normal determination of questions of law.
60 RocK, supra note 2, at 52; Graham v. Squier, 132 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777 (1943).
61 R. Soxo., FEDERAL. HAnEAS CoRpus § 4.1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SOKOL].
See also Malone v. Overholzer, 93 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1950) ; Hiatt v. Soucek, 240
Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d 432 (1949).
62 Comment, The Expanding Role of the Lawyer and the Court in Securing Psychi-
atric Treatment for Patients Confined Pursuant to Civil Commnittmnent Procedures, 6
Hous. L. REv. 519, 528 (1969) [hereinafter cited as The Expanding Role]; see In re
Tew, 280 N.C. 612, 187 S.E.2d 13 (1972). Contra, Overholser v. Boddie, 184 F.2d 240
(D.D.C. 1950); Byers v. Solier, 16 Wyo. 232, 93 P. 59 (1907).
For example, in Pennsylvania a patient must include a physician's certificate of sanity
before his application will even be considered, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4426 (1969) ;
Commonwealth ex rel. Swann v. Shoulin, 423 Pa. 26, 223 A.2d 1 (1966). Some com-
mentators have argued that such statutes unconstitutionally burden access to the courts.
10 DuQ. L. Rv. 674, 682 (1972) ; Comment, Release Procedures Under the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of r966, 5 DuQ. L. REv. 496, 501 (1967).
In Ex parte Clarke, 86 kan. 539, 121 P. 492 (1912), a provision requiring a superin-
tendent's certificate was upheld because the legislature had a valid goal in allowing the
superintendent to determine who was going to court. See Comment, Release Procedures
Under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of r966, 5 DUQ. L.
Rv. 496, 499 (1967).
63 E.g., CAL. WELl. & INST'NS CODE § 5276 (West Supp. 1972) (within two judicial
days of petition); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5126(b) (1975) (within five days after
petition).
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ings,1' requiring the patient to undergo a second hearing.
Prior decisions also suggest that review and habeas corpus alone
supply less protection than is constitutionally required for they can only
free a patient after an erroneous administrative determination resulting
in a period of unconstitutional detention. Despite the availability of a
post-termination review, welfare recipients are entitled to a prior hear-
ing so they will not be erroneously deprived of their benefits.6 Similarly,
revocation hearings are required even though, after reincarceration, the
prisoner has a right to review and to petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. 6  Detained defendants also have a right to a bail hearing.17
PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Assuming that a discharge hearing is required, a procedure should
be designed to adequately protect the patient's rights while minimizing
the burden on the state. In reality, a balanced program may more likely
be implemented than limited commitment, which provides greater pro-
tection but at a higher cost because of the judicial procedures required.
Under previous right-to-hearing decisions a judicial hearing is not
required. 8 Although a judicial hearing is usually presumed to offer the
best protection of individual rights,6 ' the lack of judicial expertise in
understanding mental illness and deficiencies in present judicial dis-
charge procedures 0 suggest an administrative system may better serve
both the patient and the state.
Personal Barriers
Mental patients seldom resort to the courts for a variety of reasons.
Because of lack of education or the debilitating effects of drugs, 1 a
patient may be incapable of understandnig possible court remedies. The
cost might also be prohibitive.72 Moreover, courtroom formality, de-
64 The Expanding Role, supra note 62, at 528.
65 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
606 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
07Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
68 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 266 (1970). Contra, United States v. Thornton, 344 F. Supp. 249, 251-52 (D.
Del. 1972).
69 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
70 Note, supra note 15, at 219.
The low number of judicial discharges (1-2 percent of all discharges, RocK, supra
note 2, at 234) provides some indication of the failure of the system. The low number
may be caused by easy administrative discharges, but also by patients' initial reluctance
to go to the courts, administrative relief if the suit is threatened, and judges' refusal to
either hear the case or grant a discharge.
71 Developments, supra note 1, at 1398.
72 Id.
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signed to heighten respect, may, for a person who has lost self respect
and confidence, evoke fear."' Institutionalization may compound this
fear and rob a patient of the initiative required to begin court proceed-
ings." Finally, patients may be reluctant to agitate within the institu-
tional community because of possible hostility or even punishment from
the staff. 5 These problems are presently partially solved only by those
states which require automatic judicial review.
Statutory Barriers
In addition to internal inhibition, statutory requirements often
impede the vindication of a patient's rights. Jurisdiction is sometimes
limited to the committing court.7 When the institution is not located
near that court, a patient with little money (or without personal control
over his estate) may face severe logistical problems. Furthermore,
complications arise once a patient reaches the courthouse. Some judges
burdened by overcrowded dockets may be inclined to dismiss mental
patients' petitions as frivolous.77 Even if a hearing is granted, crowded
dockets may force patients to wait several months in the institution.
There are, of course, no special provisions for release pending trial
because the patient is still under his original commitment order. 8
Procedural rules further complicate the discharge process. In most
states, the patient bears the burden of proving his own sanity.79 With
"clear and convincing evidence"8 he must overcome two presumptions:
that the adjudicated insanity continues to the present time"' and that the
hospital staff is correct in its refusal to discharge.8" Additionally, pa-
tients may have trouble obtaining evidence" as even the right to talk
7sBut see Deposition of Dr. Israel Zwerling, WAlyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972), reprinted in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 522
(B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973) (presence at a formal hearing might be therapeutic).
74 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
75 Landever, Regional Commissions to Monitor Confinement Institutions: A Propo-
sal, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 450, 469 (1973).
78 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.19(1) 2(1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.8037 (1972).
77 B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 46 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as ENNIS & SIEGEL].
78 Landever, sipra note 75, at 469.
70 Developments, supra note 1, at 1382; Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
80 Comment, The New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards in Compulsory Cotn-
initment and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977, 978 (1967).
a' E.g., Rosario v. State, 42 Misc.2d 699, 248 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
82 Comment, sopra note 80, at 279.
83 Note, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Cons-
mitment and Release, 34 U. CHr. L. Rav. 633, 655 (1967).
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to "outside people" is sometimes severely limited by hospital rules."'
Patients must also contend with such vague standards as "mental
illness,"8 a term courts have struggled with for years in the context of
the insanity plea. Statutes requiring a demonstration of restoration to
sanity8" are also unrealistic in light of the present state of legal psy-
chiatry. Indeed, even a "normal person" would be hard-pressed to
affirmatively show that he was legally sane. 7 Discharge decisions are
also based on "unwritten standards" extraneous to the patient's mental
health, such as availability of work and willingness of friends and
family to care for him.88 Even if the patient fulfilled the criteria re-
quired in the state statute, his release might be withheld if he could not
show someone or something was waiting for him.89
INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS
With a paternalistic desire to minimize the trauma and publicity
of a formal trial, 0 legislators denied mental patients many of the safe-
guards guaranteed in a criminal trial. For example, although the pa-
tient has notice since he or a friend must initiate the judicial proce-
dure,"' the patient is sometimes denied an opportunity to be heard. 2
Very few states grant a right to counsel in discharge proceed-
ings." Even if counsel is guaranteed, patients may have trouble finding
a lawyer willing to represent them." Lawyers often believe that the
determination of sanity is solely a medical question,"5 or they may re-
fuse to accept a case from a mental patient believing that it is prob-
ably frivolous or futile."6
At least as important as the right to counsel is the right to an
84 Id. at 655.
85 E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 334-76 (1968).
8 6 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.25 (1970); OKLA. S-',AT. 43A, § 75 (Supp.
1974).
87 Note, supra note 83, at 655-56.
88 RocK, snupra note 2, at 217-18.80 Developmnents, mupra note 1, at 1385.
In light of O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), it is clear
that such standards are no longer constitutionally acceptable. If a patient is not dangerous
(the placement of the burden of proof is not specified), the hospital cannot retain him
without treatment. The Court left undecided the question whether treatment justified
the commitment and involuntary detention of a non-dangerous person.
90 Comment, supra note 80, at 1003.
91 E.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-546 (Supp. 1974); D.C. CODE ANN. & 21-546
(Supp. 1970).9 2 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.360 (1969).
93 Comment, supra note 80, at 1003.
04 BAIEL, supra note 4, at 140.
95 RocK, supra note 2, at 238.9 6 BRAmx, supra note 4, at 139.
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independent psychiatric examination." At present, however, few states
provide a free examination."8 Advocates of this right claim that pa-
tients examined by an institutional psychiatrist are subject to biases
which hinder a fair evaluation. 9 The staff psychiatrist will have orig-
ifially refused to release the patient or may have worked closely with
the psychiatrist who made the original discharge decision. Further-
more, an institutional psychiatrist's judgment may be based on the pa-
tient's behavior within the institution rather than his mental condition
demonstrated by psychological tests.'
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGE MODEL
Defects in Present Administrative Discharge Procedures
Although most statutes require the superintendent of the hospital
to make discharge determinations, in reality this task is usually dele-
gated to a doctor.' Advocates of this system stress the importance of
the familiarity, that staff members have with both the patient and his
treatment program." 2 However, such familiarity, even if shown to
exist, may not be wholly advantageous.'03 Because staff physicians may
see patients individually as infrequently as twice a year,'" their deci-
sions are often based on reports by nurses or aides with little or no
psychiatric training.' 5 Moreover, the doctor often places undue em-
phasis on the patient's adjustment to the institution.
The power to deny release may also be used as a threat to force
97 See text accompanying note 18 supra.9 8 BRAKEm, supra note 4, at 149-52 (tables).
9 See note 45 supra.
"o Although behavior seems to be a logical factor in determining mental health,
judging a patient by his reaction to the mental hospital may be very misleading. Some
commentators assert it may be a sign of mental health to react with hostility toward the
institution instead of accepting its routines passively. C. NEWMAN, SOUrRCEBOOK OF PRO-
BATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS 335 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as NEWMAN].
101 RoCK, supra note 2, at 230.
1
0 2 BRAXEL, supra note 4, at 136; NEWMAN, stipra note 100, at 335.
10 3 See text accompanying note 100 supra. Most right-to-hearing cases have speci-
fled the decisionmaker should not be directly involved in the case. Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 259-60 (1970).
In addition, empirical studies have not supported the accuracy of institutional deci-
sions. One Veterans Administration study showed that patients judicially discharged
contrary to the institutional judgment demonstrated a better rate of adjustment to the
community than those administratively discharged. Shawver & Boquet, A Survey of
Patients Discharged by Court Order, 33 INFORMATION BULLETIN 29 (U.S. Veterans Ad-
ministration, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Psychiatry and Neurology Service,
Sept. 21, 1956). These statistics do not mean courts are the best place for discharge
determinations; instead they merely indicate that the institutional judgment is not in-
fallible. RocK, supra note 2, at 241.
104 See sources cited in note 4 supra.
105 Id.
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compliance with hospital regulations."'0 Such mistakes and abuses are
not easily checked because of the low visibility of the institutional
process.'0 Further, the dispersal of authority results in a lack of uni-
formity in discharge standards even within a particular hospital.' 8
Another deficiency in the present administrative discharge system
is the lack of patient-initiated procedures. Although a patient may
persuade his doctor to recommend a discharge, there is no formal pro-
vision for a patient himself to file a discharge application. Since there
is no way to ensure consideration of a patient's condition in those states
where periodic review is not required, the tragedy of a "lost" patient
is an ever present danger.'
Although defects in present administrative discharge processes are
obvious, a strong argument can be made for their retention as a first
level if supplemented by subsequent review. Since most patients are
quickly and efficiently discharged,"0 supplemental proceedings on be-
half of the relatively few disappointed patients might feasibly be initiated
by an official intermediary."' Such a system, however, would be lack-
ing in two respects. Under existing structures, the only possible deci-
sionmakers would be the superintendent or a judge, both incorporating
above-mentioned defects. In addition, society would still be endangered
by premature releases granted patients threatening suit.
The proposed second level administrative proceeding could pro-
vide a convenient and relaxed forum at a relatively low cost due to the
small number of cases requiring extended review. Similarly, the state
would have an opportunity to justify continued detention without the
time, cost, and publicity of a judicial hearing.'12
Second Level Administrative Review
Because of defects in both the judicial and administrative systems,
a second level of administrative review might be raore protective of
106 NE -MAN, supra note 100, at 335.
107 Id.
108 Usually the decision rests totally on the doctor's discretion, but on one ward in a
midwestern hospital, the patients vote on discharges at a group meeting. Rocx, supra
note 2, at 230.
109 Rocx, supra note 2, at 225.
"10 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
ill Landever, supra note 75, at 497; Kihss, Book Review, Ne, York Times, Mar. 30,
1975, at 22, col. 1 (for medical hospital patients) ; Developizents, supra note 1, at 1356-
58 (ombudsman to keep the patient informed of treatment and nAease alternatives).
112 The decreased visibility might be similar to the situation in which a doctor makes
his discharge decision. See text accompanying note 101 supra. The use of a panel.
however, should reduce the possibility of arbitrariness.
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patient's rights.
Working from office space within the institution, an ombudsman
could initiate discharge proceedings, monitor and publicize substandard
living conditions, and investigate patient grievances. Moreover, if a
patient's first request for discharge were refused, the ombudsman
could then begin proceedings for the second level of review." 8
Some statutes seek to involve lawyers, psychiatrists, and social
workers, to assist courts with discharge determinations." 4 Because
courts normally defer to the expert panel's decision, 5 it would serve
efficiency to eliminate judicial participation by allowing a panel to bring
its informed judgment to bear on the crucial determination.
Because relatively few patients will require a second level admin-
istrative hearing, strict procedures could be adopted to protect their
rights without unduly burdening the state.
In order to reduce fear and create familiar surroundings, the
hearing might be held in the hospital rather than in a courtroom." 6
The resulting convenience as well as the reduction in time, cost, and
publicity would also encourage hospital authorities to press more vigor-
ously their view in contested cases. Before the hearing, the review
panel should consider the hospital records as well as the superinten-
dent's justification for continued hospitalization and social worker's
reports on the patient's family, community, and availability of work.1
Since institutional doctors could no longer be considered neutral, 8
the patient should also be afforded an independent psychiatric examina-
tion."9 The waiting period between the application and the hearing
I'3 An ombudsman should have legal training and at least some experience in social
work. Although attracting such a person might prove costly for the state, the burden
could be reduced by staffing the office with students in law or social science. Landever,
supra note 75, at 496. The role would demand conscientious people who could work with-
in the institution while monitoring its inadequacies. In order to escape staff identification
with the institution, the independence of the role should be stressed.
114 The Expanding Role, supra note 62, at 533.
115 SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 122-23 (1962).
In Great Britain, which established regional Mental Health Review Tribunals under
the Mental Health Act of 1959, each panel has at least three members: a lawyer, usually
as president; a doctor; and a lay member with experience in public affairs or social
service. C. GREENLAND, MENTAL ILLNESS AND CIVIL LIBERTY 22 (1976).
"1s The required interval following an unsuccessful hearing should be reasonably
related to the time in which the patient is expected to improve. Developments, supra note
1, at 1392.
117 Such reports are utilized by the Mental Health Review Tribunals. Wood, Men-
tal Health Review Tribunals, 10 MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND THE LAw 86, 88 (1970).
11s Sarzen v. Gaughen, 489 F.2d 1076, 1086 (1st Cir. 1973).
119 Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 638 n.10 (2d Cir. 1971).
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should be limited to two weeks or less. 2 ' During this time, the degree
of formality should be chosen by the patient after reviewing his case
with the ombudsman. 21
At the hearing, protective safeguards should be applied. Counsel 22
should screen information presented to the panel and assist the pa-
tient with the presentation of his case. 23 Because strict judicial rules
are inapplicable, counsel need not be an attorney but rather a friend or
member of the ombudsman's staff. In accordance with the constitu-
tional right to be present at such proceedings,' 24 a patient would have
a right to appear and be heard. Before the patient could be excluded 25
or evidence withheld from him,'26 there should be a showing of serious
potential harm. Even though a jury is not required, the panel itself
would supply community judgment in a situation vhere standards are
less definite than those in a criminal statute." 7
Because commitment is based on the assumption that hospitaliza-
tion will cure mental illness or will restrain dangerous people from
harming themselves or society, the state should bear the burden of
affirmatively proving the necessity of continued treatment or reten-
tion.28 If, however, the patient bears the burden of proof, the standard
should be reduced from requiring an exhibition of total recovery 2 . to
demonstrating that "conditions justifying [the original] hospitalization
no longer exist."'3 0 In order to obtain the appropriate balance of
burdens, the presumption of continuing mental illness should disappear
120 This constraint will not overburden the panel because it will handle few applica-
tions in a geographically limited area.
12 Most right-to-hearing cases have held the proceedings need not be quasi-judicial.
E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
122 Most commentators agree there is a right to counsel. SOKOL, mpra note 61, at
118-20; Landever, mrpra note 75, at 466; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974);
Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
123 ENNIS & SIEGFL, supra note 77, at 11.
124 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro,
W. Va. -, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974).
125 Such a requirement, however, requires special policing. Exclusion in discharge
proceedings could be other than physical. For example, if the patient has been drugged
in the institution, he might not have recovered from the effects of the drugs. Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974).
120 The panel may gain insight into the patient's possible reaction by studying his
reaction to evidence at the commitment hearing. Developments, supra note 1, at 1395.
"27 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). There is no right to a jury in
commitment proceedings. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
128 Developments, supra note 1, at 1391-92.
129 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.25 (1970).
180 BrAxEL, supra note 4, at 461.
After O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2986 (1975), "mental illness without more!"
will not justify continued retention.
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after a reasonable period of hospitalization. In addition, the state
should provide evidence in its possession otherwise unobtainable by
the patient.'
Finally, the panel, with its combined experience and knowledge
of the community, can deal creatively with a patient who no longer
needs hospitalization, but does require some attention, as well as with
someone who simply has nowhere to go.'82 Thus, a patient would be
fairly judged, without many of the problems inherent in the judidial
system. As a result, the ultimate resolution of cases will be more satis-
factory for both patients and hospital authorities.
CONCLUSION
Discharge procedures vary considerably among states. A few have
adopted the highly protective limited confinement system. Many, how-
ever, retain paternalistic statutes for the disposition of the "insane,"
which deny even rudimentary due process. This note prescribes for
such states, as a minimal and perhaps temporary measure, an admini-
strative review system which will meet constitutional requirements while
imposing less of a burden than judicial review of each patient's case.
Constructive legislative action is urged in this unsettled area of the law
which is so susceptible to neglect.
BARBARA WOODALL KRAGIE
381 Note, stpra note 83, at 658.
182 As the abuses existing within institutions and the lack of after-care is brought to
light, groups are strongly advocating community mental health programs. See Schumach,
Localization of Mental Aid Urged by Carey Study Unit, New York Times, Jan. 26, 1975,
at 1, col. 4. See generally Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 1108 (1972).
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